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Summary  -findings
Studies  of successful  small  and medium-size  enterprises  technological  capability.  Demand for collective
(SMEs)  and their marketing  and technical  support  mcchanisms  tended to be greater when technological
systems  were undertaken for Colombia,  Indonesia,  requirements of production were comple,' or when the
Japan, and the Republic  of Korea.  Three to four  endowments  of privare technological  netwo  rks in certain
subsectors  were examined  in each country. Thc sample  countries or industries  were weak.
worldwide amounted to 445 firms.  Broad-based  collective  technical  support facilitates  the
Mechanisms  to support export marketing  varied across  emergence  of an information-rich  environment for firms,
countries and subsectors How they varied  depended  and may be worth pursuing in many settings. Examples
greatly on whether SMEs  operated within well-  of such support include:
deveoped private networks. When market peneation  *  Sponsoring  courses on specialized  topics.
begins,  nansacrion costs are high and collective  Facilitating  the use of cxpert consultants  (either
narketing support can be importanL  As marl -ts  direcdy,  by making a consultant available  to a broad
"thicken," initiatives  by foreign  buyers become more  array of firms,  or indirectly, by providing financial
important. Gcercally the most effective  collective  support for the use of consultants).
marketing  support was of the kind that can be provided  *  Promoting information-sharing  among fiirms.
more cffcctively  by decentralized  organizations  - such  Countres that already have  strong broad-based
as industry associations  or local governments  and  colleccive  support and that are moving  into
chanbers of commerce  (to support firms' participation  in  technologically  more advanced  activities  might consider
trade firs,  for example)  - than by central government  "high-intensity"  support, but should proceed with
institutions.  caution.
Private mechanisms  were more important than
collective  mechanisms  for helping firms improve their
- Ths paper  -a  product of the Finance and Private Sector  Development  Division,  Policy Research  Department -is  part
of a larger  effort in the department to examine the impact of proactive  intervention on SME  -performance.  Copies of the
paper are available  free  from the World Bank, 1818 H Street  NW, Washington,  DC 20433. Please  contact Daniele  Evans,
room N9-055, extension  38526 (43 pages).  December 1994.
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This  paper analyzes  comparatively  the results  of country  sudies of successful  small and
medium  enterprises  (SMEs)  and their support  systems  m Indonesia,  Japan, Korea  and
-Colombia.  The objective  of the research  was to shed  empirical  light  on the policy  question  of
what should  be the appropriate  role of goverment in the development  of marketi  and
technological  support  systems  for SMEs.]l We  begin  by describing  thfe  research  issues  and
methodology,  and some  background  features  of the counties. subsectors  and firms  in which
field research  was conducted.  Thereafter,  we present  in turn for each  of the dtree support
stems  the major results of the research, and their implictions for policy. We conclude by
highlightig some  general  themes  that  emerge  from the analysis  of individual  support  systems.
1: RESEARCH  BACKGROUND
I 1: Research  Issue  and Methodology-
Lawn.  Two presumptions  underlie  the decision  to focus  the research  on government  and SME
support  systems.  The first  presumption  is that the micro-environment  of private,  govem  l
and NGO (non-governmental  organization)  market  and istional  supports  external  to the
firm is an important  detrminant of SME  success.2j  Large  finms  can use non-market
medhanisms  to internalize  within  the firm  many  of the functoal  tchnical and  marketing  skils
that that  they need  to conduct  business.  SMEs,  by contrast,  lack he rsources and in-house
f1  The research  examined  also fiancial support  sstems in Japan  and  Korea. The resuts
are reported  in the individual  country  studies.
2-  This idea  is implicit  in the literatre which  ghights the role of the e  eur  in
large  firms in developing  counties as a "gap  filler. See  Jones  ain Sakong  (1980);  Kilby
(1971);  and Leibenstein  (1963, 1968). For the link  between  ffie  development  of private and
public  support  systems  and SME  parcipaton, see  Jacobs  (1969);  Pior and Sabel.  (1984);
Ranis  and Schive  (1986);  Rhee  (1988);  and Levy  (1991).2
functional diversificiation  of their larger counerparts, and depend more on exteral  sources to
acquire technological and marketing capability. Acquiring the resources they need involves
transactions costs. It follows that the less developed are technical and marketing support
systems, the higher will be the transctions  costs to SMEs, with a corresponding impainnent in
their competitive  position. So one key goal of the research is to learn what are the
characteristics of well-functioning  :upport  systems.-.
The second presumption is that the social reums  of well-functioning  SME support systems  -
and, more broadly, of SME success - exceed the private returns to individual  firns.  This
presumption can be defended via four distinct lines of reasoning. First 1 and most filiar,  is the
argument that there exist  rm  and other market failures associated with the provision
of technical and marketing support to SMEs.4/ Second, a proliferation of rapidly-grwing
SMEs holds the promise of providing a seedbed for the emergence of dynamic and efficient
arge-scale national firms, and consequently a more flexble and competitive  domestic
economy.51 Third, there can be important political economy advantages of broadening the base
of private sector pauicipation. A broader private base imples less concentrtion  of economic
power, which can rcduce the risk of the emergence of a mutualy beneficial, but socially  -
unproductive, rent-seekiqg relaionship between business and goverunent.  Moreover,  broad-
1i  Note that this goal is substantially  narrower than that of learing  what are the
determinants of SME success (which could inclide a myriad of policy and human capital
variables), with important implications  for the design of the research.
4-  For marketing and technical support, the public good character of informtion  implies
that the socially optimal supply of information  exceeds what would be supplied privately.
Collectve action problems could inhibit  firms from organizing to jointly supply 'intra-industry"
public goods.
Technically, this argument  can be viewed as one of 'inter-temporal  spillovers
Investments  today which expand the number of successful firms make the economy more
capable in the future for resonding  flexibly to shocks, and ting  advantage of new (currently
unknowable) opportnities  as they emerge  See Bruton (1985, 1989, 1993) for a concepta
discussion which makes the case that it is socially desirable for developing country
governments to pursue interventions  which lead to a more flexible economy.  -3
based  participation  in the private  sector  can ease  social  tensions,  especially  in countries  where
there are strong  divisions  between  the economicaUy  dominant  group,  and other  groups  in
society.  Fourth,  there is some  evidence  that  a substantial  role for SMEs  contributes  to a more
equitable  distribution  of inconle.A/  Given  these  four lines  of reasoning,  the corollary  follows
that if government  can intervene  in a cost-effective  manner  to improve  the prospects  of SME
success  beyond  what  would  be achieved  in a wholly  private  marketplace,  it should  do so.
Taken  together,  the two presumptions  shift  the terrain  of cebate as to whether
governments  should  intervene  to strengthen  narketing  and technological  support  systems  from
an ideological  to an empirical  one. Surprisingly,  while  there is ample  documentation  of failed
atempts at intervention,  there  has been remarkably  little  empirical  research  as to whether
collective  (governmental,  business  association  and NGO)  interventions  have  been  impoItant  for
the successful  development  of support  systems.2f  The research  summaried here is the fruit  of
a susined  effort  to fill this  gap.
Mefibgoggx- Our starting  point  for analysis  of the role of collective  interventions  was
with  the SMEs  themselves.  We sought  to learn  from stuctred  field  inteviews how  these  firis
took  care of their  marketing  and technological  tasks,  to what  extent  they  drew on external
supports  to undertake  these taslcs,  and what  was the relative  utilization  and  usefilness (as
perceived  by the finms  themselves)  of private  and collective  supports.  Our goal  in adopting  this
approach,  rather than  studying  directly  specific  imtventions  made by colective  istuons,
was to anchor  any  broader  judgements  as to the role of government  in an ue  ng  of the
dynamics  of the private  marketplace  itself.
fit  See, for example  the analysis  in Fei, Ranis  and Kuo  (1979)  of the relation  between  the
evolution  of income  distrbution  in Taiwan  and the role of SMEs.
- - U  For some  studies  of the role  of technical  and  mar  support,  see Hogan.  Keesing
and Singer  (1991);  Schmitz  and Musyck  (1993);  Cortes,  Berry  and Lshaq  (1987);  Berry and
Mazumdar  (1991);  and  Nugent  (1990).  Rhee,  Ross-Larson  and Pursell  (1984)  used  a...
methodology  similar  to the present  one  to examine  the acquisition  of technical  and  maketing.
capability  by large firms.4
How we selected our sample of firms was crucial for the broader validity of our policy
judgements. The key decision was to target the empirical analysis on successes: successful
countries, successful subsectors, successful firms. The underlying presumption was that the
economic institutions identified by firms as important  for successful outcomes are themselves at
least reasonably efficient.BI  The research followed the lead of other analyses,2/ and used direct
or indirect participation in export markets as the primary criterion of success (although, as will
be seen, in conducting the research it was not possible to adhere rigidly even to this criterion of
export-orientation).
While in general the presumption that the.institutions  identified by firms as efficient
were indeed  so seems reasonable to us, the reader can continully test any policy judgements
we draw from our evidence  by posing  questions  as to the cou  uribcua.  Key  questions  to keep
in mind include: Given that the SMEs surveyed inleed appear efficient is it probable that, in
the absence of some co'1 ective institution  identified as impormtant,  their performance would have
worsened? Alternatively, should there be reason to  qution  whether the. surveyed firms indeed
are economically  efficient, is it nonetheless  probable that any collective institution deemed to  be
making a positive contriLution  would still be socially useful in an environment populated by.
economically  efficient firms?
In principle, variations across subsectors in their tecihologies and patterns of indusrial.
.orgnization might influence  the role of collective  supports. Similarly,.  their role could be
affected by -variations across countries in the levels of development of their private sectors, and
.the  manner of their integration into the world economy. To account for these variations, we
sampled across a broad range of countries and subsectors.
. /  This presumption is standard in the economic analysis of institutions. See, for example,
-- - -Oliver  Williamson's (1985, 1975) analyses of transactions costs, and Douglass  North's (1981)
3nalysis of the relatonship between property rights and economic growth. While at the limit
*  - applications of the presumption can degenerate into tautologies, with careful design it is
possible to formulate empirically testable propositions.
92/  For example, Pack and Westphal (1986), Krueger (1984), and the World Bank's
recn  (1993) study of the East Asia miracle.5
-:lbe  samW.  Ideally, the sample of countries and subsectors would have been large
enough to make it possible to analyze cross-country variations in support systems for a
particular subsector, as well as cross-sectoral  variations in support systems widtin individual
countries. In practice, as Table I summarizes, budget limitations restricted the research to four
countries; 34  subsectors were examined in each country, with the sample worldwide
amounting to 445 firms. Details of sampling decisions with respect to subsectors and firns  are
contined  in the individual  country studies.
While all four countries presently are  judged to be relatively "successful" examples of
development, they were intentionally  chosen to encompass  a wide spectrum of development
experiences. They vary radically in 1991  per capita incomes  - from $610 for Indonesia, to
$1,260 for Colombia, $6,330 for Korea and $26,930 for Japan. Two of the countries are
located in North-East Asia, one in South-East  Asia, and one in Latin America.
Unavoidably, given the wide variety of levels of development (and resource
endowments), and the.  desire to focus on export-oriented  subsectors, it was not possible to
achieve much overlap in the subsectors studied across countries. Yet the costs of limited
overlap are less than they might first appear. For one thing, even within seemingly identical
subsectors, there are substantial variations across countries in both the specific products
produced and in the patterns of iudustrial organization.j/  For another, as the analyses of
marketing and technical support systems will reveal, it is not product-type per se that is the
crucial basis for comparson. For marketing support systems, what turns out to be crucial is the
distinction  between subsectors in which SMEs are embedded in pre-existing private networks,
JQ/  To cite one example, Levy (1991) compares the footwear export industries of Korea
- and Taiwan. Not only are there differences in their mixes of products (Taiwan produces
relatively more plastic footwear, Korea relatively more leather), even when the product is
identical (e.g. running shoes with leather uppers) there have historically been radical
differences in their paterns of industial  organization, with large firms dominant in Korea and
SMEs in Taiwan.5a
TABLE 1:THE  SAMPLE OF COUNTRIES AND)  SUBSECTORS
(NUMBER  OF FIRMS SAMPLED IN BRACKES)
INDONESIA (91)  COLOMBIA  (125)  KOREA (122)  JAPAN (107).
Garments (34)"  Garments (47)  Woven Textiles (42)  Woemet!sin
_____________  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  ~~ ~~~~Fukui-1(33).
Rattan Furniture (33)  Automotive  Automotive
Components  (20)  Copnsin  Ohta
_____________  _____________  ____________~~_  (34)
Carved Woodetn  Eectranic
Furniture in Jepara  Conmponets  (20)
(24)_  _  _  _  __  ___
Machfiney (44)  Factory Automaion
_______  ~~~~~~~~~(40)_  _  _  _
Leather Produt  (3)Silverware  in
Tsubame (40)6
and activities  where  no such  networks  exist;  six of fte subsectors  selected  fit into  the former
category,  and seven  into the latter. For technical  support  systems,  a crucial  distinction  is
between  simple,  craft-based  and complex,  engineering  and science  based  technologies.
1.2  omne  Backgound Characteristics  of Subsectors.  Entrereneurs and Firms
Here we highlight  three sets  of characteristics  of the firn samples:  the rates  of growth
of the firms surveyed;  the education  and experience  of entrepreneurs;  and the relation  between
the fimns  surveyed  and  pattems  of subcontracting  in their respective  subsectors.
Not surDrisingly,  given  our focus  on success,  the Indonesian,  Colombian  and Korean
firms  sampled  all have enjoyed  very substantdal  expansion  since  stal-up.1l/ As Table  2 shows,
the start-up size of the Colombian firms sampled  was very nmaii, with 76 percent of them
having  20 or fewer  employees,  and only 10  percent  50 or more  employees.  By the time of the
survey,  however,  these  proportions  had virtually  reversed,  with 54 percent  in excess  of 50
employees,  and only 14 percent  with fewer  than  20. The averge start-up  size of firms  sampled
in Indonesia  was larger; even  so, 48 percent  of them  commenced  with fewer  than 50
employees,  and only 23 percent  with  more than  250. But  by survey  time only 9 percent still
had fewer  than  50 employees,  while  56 percent  had  250 or more. As  for Korea, Table  2
documents  substantial  firm  growth,  though  less  than  in the other  countries.  However,  for Korea
in particular  these  employment  data  subsanmially  underestimate  the grorith  of firms,  since
Korean wages  have risen  very rapidly  and firns have  responded  by substituing  capital  for
labor, while  achieving  very rapid increases  in viue added.
As Table-  3 shows,  the levels  of education  of these  successful  SMEs  are stiingly  high.
In both Korea  and Colombia,  over 80  percent  of the entrepreneurs  sampled  bad completed  at
least  some  university;  and, at 75 percent,  the proportion  was almost  as high for Indonesia's
garment  and rattan  entrepreneurs.  Half of the Korean  sample  had undertaken  their  university
studies  in the field of science  or engineering.  And  prior to startng their firms,  over 90 percent
.11,1  The Japanese  firims  are substantially  older,  and we do not  have comparable  data.6a
TABLE  2:  THE GROWTH  OF FIRMS
% FIRMS  WITH  NO MORE  THAN  % FIRMS  WITH  A *LARGE"
A "SMALLO  NUMBER  OF  NUMBER  OF E)APLDYEESW'
EMPLOYEES'
START-UP  CURRENT  START-UP  CURRENT.
INDONESIA  48%  9%  23%  56%
COLOMBIA  76%  14%  10%  54%
KORAd  .81%  34%  4%  36%
NOTES:  a! 'SmallI is defined  differently  for dhe  three  countries. For Indonesi'a  and Korea  it is 50,  and for Colombia  20
employees
b/ 'Large" is defined  differently  for thie  three countries. For Indonesia  it is'at least 250, for Colombia  it is 50,
and for Korma  it is 100  employees.
Cl  xcudngwoven txie,wher  employment  increases  were limited  as a result  of a shift to automatic  loans.6b
TABLE 3: EDUCATION AND EXPERIENCE.OF ENTREPRENEURS
PERCENTAGE  OF ENTREPRENEURS  SAMPLED  WITH:-  ______
HIGH  ~~SOME  UNIVERSITY  IEDUCATION'  PRIOR
SCHOOL  OF WCTEXEENEIN
EDUCATION-  RELATED
OR LESS  BUSINESS
COUNTRY  AT LEASr  GRADUATE  A  SCIENCE OR
SOME - ENGINEERING  PRIOR_:_-__
INDONESIA  __OR_LESS_  .:BUNS  :  *
Ganents  'and  25%  75%  .
Rattan
- Iepara  -7i..--:71  29  -
COLOMBIA  17  83  19%
(ALL)  ______
FKOREA (ALL)  13  87.  .11  50%  91%7
of the Koreans  had experience  in a related  business,  almost  60 percent  of them  in a
management  position.  A substantial  majority  of the Japanese  sample  also reported  having  had
prior experience  in a related  business.
The exceptions  to the overall  pattern of high education  are revealing.  The export
entrepreneurs  from Jepara, Indonesia  are shown  in Table  3 to be substantially  less educated
tha  in the other  countries  and subsectors;  uniquely  among  the subsec-tors  studied,  their source
of competitive  advancage  lies in unusually  well-developed  wood-carving  skills.  Also, although
not shown  in the table,  the owners  of the Japanese  SMEs  samnpled,  espec-ially  those  in their
fifties  or older,  tend  to have  no more  than  high  school  education.  However,  as the  diLscussion  Of
marketing  supportsystems  below  will highlight,  they  appear  to face  fewer  marketing  demands
tha  the other  entrepreneurs,  inoar  as they  operate  within  a well-developed  network  of inter-
firm relatins.
Finally,  subcontracting  relations  are ubiquitous  in all four  countries.  As thie  cotuntry~
case describes  in detail, all of the Japanese  firms  surveyed  are embedded  in vertical,  multi-tier
prodution and marketing  relations.  In Korea, 82 percent of the firms  surveyed  subcontract,  out
either  specific-  production  tasks  or fabrication  of the entire  product;  the corresponding  figures
for Indonesia  and C-olombia  are 76 percent  and 67 percent.  What  is remarkablc  about the
Korean  experience  in particular  is the rapidity  of change  in the role of subcontracting,  in
industrial  production.  In 1973,  only 25 percent  of all Korean  SMEs  earned  any-revemue  from
subcontracting;  by 1990,  subcontracting  was a source  of revenue  for 70 percent  of Korean
firms, and fulfly  90 percent  of these  earned  over 80 percent  of their revenue  in this manner-
For all of the pervasiveness  of subcontracting,  and for all that its expansion  (as in
Kore) doubtless  multiplies  the opportunities  available  to small  business,  the results  of the:
Indonesian  and  Colombian  firm  surveys  sound  a note  of'  caution  as to whether  subcontracting
can serve straightforwardly  as a stepping-stone  to SME  success  mn  export  markets.  Fewer than
14  percent of the Colomobian  SME  exporters  surveyed,  and fewer  tha  22 percent of the
hidoneian SUE exporters,  had themselves  had  prior experience  as subcontractors  prior to
becomning  direct  exporters.  Considered  together  with the evdneeneucto  lees,  these8
data point  to the possibility  of substantial  dualism  among  SMEs,  with an educated  minority
successfully  "graduating"  to become  direct  exporters,  and  the majority  more-or-less
permanently  engaged  in the international  marketplace,  if at all, only indirectly  as
subcontractors.
II: EXPORT  MARKETIG AND lTS SUPPORT  SYSTEMS
Even  with  favorable  market  conditions,  exports  do not  proceed  spontaneously,  but
through  the medium  of institutions,  and via exchanges  which  involve  both ecx  ante and ecx  post
transactions  costs.  Ex ante  transactions  costs  comprise  the costs  of search  by buyers  and sellers
to identify  a party  with whom  to transact Ex post  transactions  costs  comprise  the costs  to one
party that result  from non-performance  by the other.  SME  success  in export  markets  thus
requies the presence  of mechanisms  which  reduce  the costs  of search  to SME  suppliers  and to
their buyers,  and which  can reliably  signal  the reputaion of suppliers  to putative  buyers  (and
vice versa).
A central  goal  of this stLdy  is to leam what  was the role of collective  marketing  support
systems  - how  extensively  they  were used  by SME  exporters,  how  much  value SMEs  ascnrbed
to them, and what  specific  lknds  of collective  support  were most  highly  valued  by SMEs.  Yet
firms  do not make  their decisions  on the use of collective  marketing  support  in a vacuum.
There also  exist  a range of private  channels  which  reduce  the tasactions  costs  to firms  of
participating  in export  markets  - trading intermediari,  search  efforts  by foreign  buyers,
opportnities for indirect  exporting  via subcontracting,  and  the presence  of other  prc-enistg
private  networks  that can ease  entry into  export  markets.  Where  they  exist,  these  private
networks  represent  substite  channels  which  reduce  SME  demand  for collective  support.
Additionally,  SMEs  eager  to export  can make direct  efforts  of their own  to win  orders -
although  collective  support  Cif  it Is  availale) is likely  to complement,  rather  than substitute  for,
such efforts.
IbThe  next  subsections  analyze  comparatively  for Indonesia,  Japan, Korea  and  Colombia
the supply  of private  mechanisms  of export  support,  and  the impact  of their availalit  on the9
use of collective support. Thereafter, we describe in some detail the specific kinds of collective
marketing support have proven useful in the sample countries, and the specific institutional
mechanisms that have been most effective in delivering them.
I1.  1: 1hadingMchanisms of Eport  Marketing
The field research uncovered very substantial variation in the mechanisms of export
marketing across countries and subsectors. Taken together, three propositions appear to
sumnarize  much of this variation:
* Variations in industrial organization infuence the m  anisms of export
marketing. In some instances, SMEs are embedded in well-developed, pre-
existing private networks, with low tasactions  costs of entering export
markets, and with virtually no role for collective support. In others, the
challenge of linking into the iternational  marketplace is more formidable,
involves higher transactions costs to SMEs and calls for distictive  m  g
mechanLisms.
-ntertemporal.  variations within individual iadustdes influence the mechanisms
of export marketing. In the initial period of market penetration of a new export
industry, transactions costs are high and domestic-resources  play an important
role. Subsequently, markets "thicken", inidatives by foreign buyers become
more important, and the transactionm  costs of export entry by SMEs declie.  (A
parallel pattern is evident over the life cycle of firms, regardless of the tining
of first export entry.)
*  Variations across counties  in the extent of their engagement in the
international marketplace influence the mehanisms of export marketing. The
challenges and mechanisms of export marketing are very different, and the
transactions costs of penetrating these markets are lower, for SMEs active in
countries that are already "on the map" as export suppliers, than for those
active in countries whose  export drive is still in its infimcy.
Table 4 offers capsule summaries of the experiences of the four countries studied in
relation to these propositions. The experiences of Japan and Indonesia iustrae  the impact on
marketing patterns of industrial organization and related pre-existing networks, and those of
Korea and Colombia (plus Indonesia again) illustrate both the evolution of marketing
mechanisms from the pioneering export phase onward, and the impact on this evolution of a
country's profile in the global marketplace.
Japan and Indonesia: The'Power of Pre-existing Private Networks:a.
TABLE  4:  THE  IMPACT  OF COUNTRY  CHARACTERISTICS  AND
INDUSTRIAL  ORGANIZATION  ON  MECHANISMS  OF EXPORT
MARKETING  - A  SUMMARY  OF COUNTRY  EXPERIENCES
INDUSTRIAL  COUNTRY'S  EXPORT
ORGANIZATION  PROFILE-
JAPAN  No  direct marketing;  SMEs  Not  Applicable
embedded in dense, pre-
existing private networking
INDONESLA  Extended Chinese communitky  Nascent reputation as export




KOREA  Emergent  network  of  export  Strong  reputation  as exporter
traders (inter-temporal,  simplifies direct export
Dimension)  marketing for SMEs
(subsubent  to initial market
. . . ~~~~~enty)- 
COLOMBIA  Limited pre-existing  networks  Limited  exposure  to export
marketplace  complicates
. ______::____.___-_  marketing for SME exporters10
In different  ways, the Japanese  and Indonesian  studies  highlight  the power  of pre-
exisdng  private  networks  in facilitating  SME  participation  in the export  marketplace.
Jpan.  Across  the gamut  of Japanese  industry,  the marketing  of SME  products  is taken
care of virtually  automatically  by pre-existing  private  production  and trading  networks,  with no
direct  interface  between  the firm  and its foreign  buyer,  and virtually  no role for collective
support The three subsectors  examined  in the Japan  case  study illustrate  the wide variety  of
patterns  of industrial  organization  that yield  this outcome.
Multi-ter.  subcontracting  relations  among  Japanese  SMEs  engaged  in the production  of
automobile  components  in the town  of Ohta comprise  a by-now  familiar  example  of a pre-
existing  private  network.  Fuji Industries  (assembler  of the Subarn  automobile)  is located  in the
region,  and half of Obta's first-der  subcontractors  supply  parts .o the company.  Sales  to Fuji
Industries  account  for 43 percent  of sales  of these  firms,  with vitualy  all other sales  going  to
other automobile  assemblers  in Japan. Dependence  on a dominant  parentfin  grew for the
tehnically less-sophisdcated  second-tier  and lower-tier  subcontractors,  with 75 percent of sales
of second-tier  subcontractors  going  to their  parent  fErms.
In Japan's silverware  and  textile  subsectors,  the pre-existing  private networks
comprised  interactions  with  trading  houses  and  withi  mput  suppliers.  Tsubame's  silverware
exports  have long  been channelled  tbrough  the country's  export  trading  houses;  indeed,  as of
the time of our survey  these trading  houses  continued  to account  for 80% of export sales.  And
SME.  weavers  of synthetic  textiles  in Fukui-Ishilkawa  are embedded  in center-satellite  relations
to an even  larger degree  than their silverware  counterparts:  about 85%  of textile  weaving  takes
place under 'service fee contracts"  in which  trading  houses  or yar-producing chemical
companies  supply  yarn to SME  weavers,  which  is woven  and dyed,  and then  retumed  to the
yam supplier  for subsequent  sale.
In all, indirect  exporting  through  pre-existing  private  networks  was so pervasive  in
Japan  that it proved infeasible  to systematically  sample  firms  as to the relative  value  of different
kinds of marketing  support  for direct  exports.Indonesia. In Indonesia, the impact of another kind of pre-existing network is
highlighted by sharp differences in the mechanisms  of export marketing of pribumi and non-
pribumi (Chinese) finns. These differences appear to be the result of linkages among an
extended Chinese community  that transcend national boundaries and provide an informal
private network into which Indonesia's entrepreneurs of Chinese origin - but not their pribumi
counterparts - can straightforwardly connect.
As Table 5 suggests for rattan furniture exporters, pre-existing linkages translate into a
superior ability on the part of non-pribumi firms to make initial export contacts outside of
Indonesia: 63% of initial export contacts of non-pribumi  Indonesian finis  were made outside
the country (via a business trip abroad, or a friend or agent based abroad), as compared with
only 15% for pribumi firms. As the table shows, the disparity in the role of contacts made
abroad continues even as fims  become established in export markets. In garments, too, 53 % of
the most recent export contacts for non-pribumi firms - but none for pribumi firms -were
made abroad-42/ Lacking both contacts abroad and ready access to buyers visiting Indonesia,
pnriumi garment and rattan furniture firms made use of substitute  mechanim.  Thus over half
-the pribumi firms in Table 5 (but under 20 percent of the non-pribui)  used collective-
mechanisms to link up with export markets.
Korea. Colombia (and Indonesia again:  Penetrating the Exportn  Marketlace  de Novo
Unike  Japanese and non-pnbumi Indonesian firms, SMEs in Korea and Colombia
generally lacked access to pre-existing prvate  networks, as did Indonesia's pribumi SMEs.-
Consequently, empirical analysis of these settings  holds the promise of showing how marketing
mechanisms start-up and evolve as specific new export activities take hold, with resultant
declines in tie transactions costs of export entry by SMEs. Additionally, the radicaly different
export profiles of Colombia on the one hand, and Korea and Indonesia on the other, provides.
121  Note, though, that despite extensive search it was only possible to identify six pribmi.
garment firms for inclusion in the sample. The third Indonesian case, that of carved furniture
exports from Jepara, does not shed any useful light on the role of pre-existing networks; all
but one of the firms surveyed were pnbumi, and they were not embedded in any pre-existing
network.lla
TABLE 5:  MARKETING CONTACTS AMONG RATrAN FURNrrURE  EXPORTER
INITIAL CONTACTS  CURRENT-  CONTACTS
Pribumni  NonProbumi  Prium  fNon~Pribumi
PRIVATE__  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
In County  4  3  13  13
Abroad  210  4  26
COLLECTIVE  7  3  1s  6
TOTAL  13  16  3-5  45
-~  .-  ---12
-an.  opportunity  to explore how much inpact a.country's broader profile in theintemnational
marketplace  has on the development  of export marketing  mechanisms.
Korea  The way in which Korean SMEs have been incorpoated into that country's
industrial  economy is different from the Japanese  patten.  Whereas Japanese indusrial
organization  is characterized  by a dense network of interaction  between large and small firms
along  the lines described'above, Korea's industrial  success in the 1960s  and early.  1970s  was
built on its giant industrial conglomerates,  with SMEs playing an increasing  role only afier
1977. Moreover, the ties between  large and small firms have been looser in Korea than in
Japan, with a correspondingly  greater extent of direct participation  in exports among Korean
SMEs1.'
As Table 6 shows, large firms tended to be the export pioneers, but direct SME exports
expanded rapidly in all four subsectors  studied.  While in the woven textile and electronic  parts
subsectors  exports were substantidal  aready in 1983, in the remaining  two subsetors the move
by SMEs into export markets  took place only in the lat  half of the 1980s. For woven  teffiles
the pioneering phase of SME exports actually  predates the export start-Wp  of most of our
sample  firms.
Table 7 details for each subsector  the relative importnce of four mecnisms  of export
marketing at various points in time.-  For Korea, export 'sLoflmtigfl  refers to manufacture
against specifications  for export by traders, fl  to production of components  for assemblers
who export finisheaL  products. As Table 7 confirms, in all periods marketing  of woven textiles .
is dominated  by a network of specialist  export traders/subcontractors  with headquarters or
branch offices  clustered in the area of Taegu, the location  of almost 80 percent of Korea's
woven textile firns.  As noted, woven teffile SMEs already had established  a position  in export
131  In the automobile  and electronic  components  subsectors,  the majority of firms surveyed
were embedded in subcontracting  relations with large assemblers,Sales  to assembler-principals
accounted  for over 90% of sales for 14 of the 20 Korean auto parts firms surveyed, and for 9
of 20 electronic  parts firms. However, even in these sectors over 60 percent of surveyed firms
:-manuactued  at least some products direcdy for export markets; these direct exports were the
focus of the analysis  of export marketing  in the Korean case study.12a
TABLE 6:  EXPORTS  BY KOREAN  SMEs IN FOUR SUBSECTORS
(MILLION OF USS)
1-  ~  ~~~  -.  . T  ,  . .
WOVEN  AUTO PARTS  ELECTRONIC  METAL CUTTING
TEXTILES  jPARTS  |EQUIPMENT
19 83  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
SME Export Value  - 349  4  199  21
|(USMilions)  _  _
SME Shares of  21.3%  9.6%  19.5%
Total Exports
-1988.
SMEExport Value  1,454  83  134%  68
=  (USsKllions)  -
SME Shares of  42.8%  25.9%  22.9%
Total Exports
I991
SMEExportValue  3,453  - 184  2380  123
(USMMIIions)
SME Shares of  60.6%  44.1%  24.8%
Total Exports - =12b
TABLE  7:  KOREA  - THE RELATIVE  USEFULNESS  OF EXTERNAL
MARKETING  SUPPORT  (ALL  FIRMS I  LEAST  USEFUL;  5 =  MOST  USEFUL)
DIRECT  BUYER  SUBCONTRACTING COLLECTIVE  -
MARKETING_  INITIATIVE  PRINCIPAL  - i SUPPORT  -
Woven Textiles
* Start-up, Pioneers-  2.4  3.2  4.2  1.2
| Start-up, Followers  2.5  2.4  4.0  1.3
urQ  t, All  2.5  -2.8  3.7  - 1.3
Auto Parts  :  _  - . -
Start-up, Pioneer  2.5  1.0  3.3-  2.2_
Start-up, Followers  1.5  3.8  2.2  - 2.0.
Current,  Alt  3.0  - 3.6  2.8  1.3
Electronic Parts  - ___-_-_::-
Start-up, Pioneers  2.0  1.8  2.8  3.3
|Strt-up. Followers-  .6  j  1.8  3.0  2.4
Current, All  3.4  3.9  .1.6  1.5
Factory Automation  -
Start-up, Pioneers  3.2  2.7  2.8  1.5
Start-up, Followers  2.3  3.6  -2.2  2.0
Current, All  4.0  3.6  2.0  - *  2.013.
markets  by the late 1970s,  and there is very little  variation  across  periods  in the relative
importance  of the various  export  marketing  mechanisms.  The export  marketing  patterns for this
subsector  parallel  more  those  of Japan  and non-pribumi  Indonesian  firmns  than  they  do those  of
the remaining  three Korean  (and  the Colombian)  subsectors.  For the rest, the Korean  survey
results  illustrate  vividly  how  export marketing  channels  evolve  - how  SME  exports get going
in individual  subsectors,  and how  the transactional  environment  for export  marketing
"thickens"  as the number  of SME  exporters  proliferates.
Table  7 organizes  the subsectoral  data  on the relative  importance  of various  marketing
mechanisms  into three time-related  subgroups  - the time of the field  survey;  and firms' initial
period of entry into export  markets,  with initial  export  entry in turn disaggregated  between
pioneer SME  exporters  and SMEs  that  moved  into international  markets  only  once the industry
had established  its role as an exporter.  As the table shows,  the initial  imnpetus  for exports in the
three subsectors  came  primarily  from resources  already  within  the country  - from export
traders, from coilective  marketing  support  institutions,  and from exporting  firms  themselves.
Traders/subcontractors  played  the leading  pioneer  role for auto  parts SMEs,  and the second
most inportant role in electronic  parts and factory  automation  SMEs.  Their prominent  early
role can be interpreted  as an important  spillover  for Korean  SMEs  from being active  in a
country  with a strong export  profile,  insofar  as it was the country's  earlier export  success.
(typically  by larger firms)  that brought  these  traders/subcontractors  onto the scene. Collective
marketing  support  leads among  pioneer  electronic  parts SME  exporters,  and has a significant
subsidiary  role in auto parts. Direct  marketing  efforts  by firms  provided  the critical  initial
impetus  in the factory  automation  subsector,  and also scored  high among  autoparts  pioneers.  In
aU  three subsectors  the role of direct  marketng declines  for the export start-up  of follower
exporters,  but picks  up again  for current  exports.
Over time, initiatives  of foreign  buyers  come  to the fore. Buyer  initiatives  are identified
in Table  7 as the least important  mechanism  for initial export  entry by pioneer  SMEs  in the
auto and electronic  parts subsectors,  and second  least  important  for factory  automation.  But
information  appears  to spread rapidly  as Korean  firms  come on line  as a primary international14
supply  source for yet anotherproduct.  Indeed,  in the later periods  initiatives  by foreign  buyers
emerge  in all three subsectors  as the leading  mechanism  for facilitating  participation  in export
markets.
In all, then, the evidence  from Korea  on export  marketing  suggests  that "export  entry
begets  export entry", that a cumunlative  process  can take  hold.14 In all three subsectors  for
which  we have  data, local  actors (presumably  prompted  by numerous  export incentives)  led the
pioneering  phase  of SME  exports.  Their activity  took  place  against  the backdrop  of Korea's
strong  overall reputation  as a reliable  and cost-effective  supplier  of exports.  Once  exports of a
new  product  were underway,  foreign  buyers  came  onto the scene,  and the momentum  of
sustaining  the export  drive shifted  increasingly  into their  hands, with  complementary  efforts  by
increasingly  committed  export  suppliers.  Throughout  the process,  the transactions  costs  of
linling into export markets  progressively  declined,  with corresponding  increases  in
opporunities  for export entry by SMEs.
Colokmbia.  Like their Korean  (but unlike  their Japanese  or non-pnbumi  Indonesian)
counterparts,  Colombian  SMEAs  lacked  access  to pre-existing  private  networks  to link into the
export marketplace.  The Colombian  garment  industry  experienced  an export  surge in the 1970s
with exports  in 1980  amounting  to over $110  million  already  in 1980,  too early for the
pioneenng  export phase  to be depicted  adequately  by our firm sample.  The export  take-offs  in
the leather  products  and machinery  subsectors  came  over a decade  laterIjf and so offer
evidence  of the pioneering  phase  of export  marketing  of new  products.
As was observed  for Korea  domestic  resources  played  a leading  role in the pioneering
export efforts  of Colombian  firms  in the leather  and  machinery  subsectors.  Direct  marketing
-4/  Hirscbman  (1958)  was a pioneering  study  of the role of cumulative  processes  in
economic  development.  Levy (1989)  modelled  formally  the role of cumulative  processes  in
the development  of export  markets.
:1.5/  Garment  exports  subsequently  declined  to a low  of $40 miWion  in 1983,  but expanded
later in the decade  to reach $449  million  by 1991. In the machinery.  subsector,  too, exports
peaked  at $39  million  in 1980,  subsequently  declined  to $12  million,  but then expanded  in
recent  years  to reach $102 million  by 1992.  Leather  product  exports  got underway  only in the
1980s,  rising  from $14 million  in 1984  to $106  million  by 1991.15
efforts  of firms  emerge  in Table  8 as the leading  mechanism  of export market  penetration  for
pioneer  firms  in both subsectors.  Collective  marketing  support  plays  a signiflcant  subsidiary
role for pioneer  exporters,  as well  as a continuing  useful  (though  diminishied)  role as the
subsector  matures.
Aside from this central  similarity,  there also are some  striking  differences  between
Colombia  and Korea  in the marketing  mechanisms  of pioneer  exporters,  differences  which
plausibly  result  from the divergent  export  profiles  of the two  countries.  For all that Colombia
has the reputation  of being  one of the few  Latin  American  countries  to have maintained  a
relatively  liberal  trade regime  for a sustained  period  of time,  until very recently  Colombian
industrial  policy  placed nowhere  near  the emphasis  on exports  as did Korea's, and Colombian
firms  have had nowhere  near the sustained  presence  in manufactures  export  markets  as have  the
Koreans.  One consequence  of this limited  history  which  is evident  in Table &  is the virtual
absence  of trading  and  subcontracting  ties as a mechanism  of export market.penetration  for
- Colombian  SMEs;  by contrast,  such ties were of central  inportance  for pioneering  Korean
A second  and somewhat  more  puzzling  difference  is in the role of foreign  buyers:
despite  Colombia's  lower  export  profile, foreign  buyers  are relatively  more important  at the
pioneering  phase  for Colombian  than  for Korean  SME  exporters.  One plausible  resolution  of
this apparent  paradox  may  be that, by comparison  with  their Korean  counterparts,  Colombian
firms historically  have  been less  interested  in international  opportunities  at the early stages  of
export market  development,  and so have left relatively  more of the (modest  in absolute  terms):
early running  to foreign  buyers.  Further, whereas  in Korea  the relative  importance  of direct
marketing  efforts  and initiatives  by foreign  buyers  shifted  sharply  in favor  of foreign  buyers  as
the export drive deepened,  in Colombia  direct marketing  initiatives  play the leading  role even
in the current  period.  Plausibly,  this tardier responsiveness  of foreign  buyers  to emerging
opportunities  to source  from Colombia  is a consequence  of the lower  profile  of the country  in.
the global  marketplace.  Put differently,  the evidence  suggests  that  the cumWulative  process  of
ncreasing  participation  by foreign  buyers, declining  transactions  costs  of export  marketing,  and15a
TABLE 8:  COLOMBIA  - THE RELATIVE  USEFULNESS  OF EXTAERAL
MARKETING  SUPPORT (ALL  FIRMS 1 =  LEAST  USEFUL; 5  =  MOST  USEFUL)
-.  -1  - _  _  _  I  _  _  _  I  _  _  _  _  __  I  _  _''  _  _-i  _  _.-.-
.DIRECr  B  YER  SUBCONTRACTING  COLLECTIVE
*  MARKETING  INITIAITVE  PRINCIPAL  SUPPORT-
Leather Products  ._-_._  ._  .
Start-up, Pioneers  4.4  :  3.5  1.8  2.6
Start-up, Follower.  3.5  3.7  2.3  1.8
Current, All  3.9  3.4  1.4  .2.5
Garments  ._-  _-  __  - ___  -_  -_:.
Start-up, Pionsers  3.7  3.9  1.4  3.0
Start-up, Followers  -3.7  3.6  1.2  1.3
Curret,  All  3.8  3.6-  1.1  2.4
MachLinery  _  - . -_._____:_-__
Start-up,  Pioneers  3.9  3.0  1.0  2.5
Start-up, Followers  4.2  3.6  1.3  1.9
CUrrent,  A1l  L3.8  3.2  . 1.2  I  2.216
increasing  participation  by SMEs  has not  yet taken  hold in Colombia  with  anything  like  the
vigor  that  we observe  for Korea.
-donesia (again).  For all three ndonesian  subsectors,  our surveys  yielded  evidence  on
the evolutdon  of export  channels.  As Table  9 shows,  relative  to both  Korea  and Colombia,
initiatives  by buyers  turn out to be unusually  dominant  in all time  periods.
For the pioneering  periods,  the explanation  for buyer  dominance  vanes across
subsectors.  For garments,  the  presence  of pre-existing  networks  among  the  extended  Chines
community  along  the lines  nated  earlier  provides  sufficient  explnation,  since  the vast  majority
of that  industry's  garment  exporters  are Chinese  in background.  By contrast,  most  of the
wooden  fumiture  exporters  in the  sample  were  pnibumi,  based  in the traditional  woodcarving
center  of Jepara,  who  took  advantage  of the area's abundant  supply  of carving  skills  to produce
reproduction  antique  furniture  for export  markets.  Paralleling  ihe pattern  hypothesized  for
Colombia,  Jeparan  producers  had not  initially  set their  sights  beyond  the  domestic  market.  So,
- - as the case  study  details,  and  as is signalled  by the score  for buyer  initiatives  im  Table  9, the
initial  impetus  for exports  came  from outsiders.
For rattan  funiture, it is necessary  to distngish between  the "prehistory  and the
acuala  period  of export  take-off.  in the 1970s  and  early 1980s,  rattan  furniture  exports  were
pioneered  by a small  number  of predominandy  prbumi entrepreneurs.  They  are the finns
grouped  in the "pioneer"  category  and, as can  be seen  in Table  9 and  consistent  with the
discussion  earlier,  were  disproportionately  dependent  on collective  support  for the initial  export
efforts.  However,  take-off  of rattan  fritmre  exports  came  only  in the latter  1980s,  at about  the
---  time  the Indonesian  govermnent  banned  the  export  of raw  and semi-processed  ratan. The
majonty  of new  exporters  during  this  phase  were  Chinese  (many  of them  former  traders  in raw
rattan)  who,  as in garments-  were  able  to rely on their  extended  network  to penetrate  export
markets.  Thus, as Table  9 shows,  at export  start-up  non-pribumi  "follower"  firns identified
buyer  initatives  as their  most  important  source  of support.  To be sure,  some  of the "follower"
-entrants  were  pibumi. However,  they  lacked  access  to the network  and hence,  as is evident  in
.~~~nmswr  neieti-16a
TABLE 9:  INDONESIA  - THE RELATIVE  USEFULNESS  OF EXTERNAL
MARKEnNG SUPP(RT  (ALL FIRMS 1  LEAST USEFUL; 5 =  MOST  USEFUL) I  DIRECT  - BUYE  | SUBCONTRACTING COLLECTIVE
._____  |MARKETING__|  INiTIATRVE  | PRINCIPAL  SUPPORT
Start-up, Pioneers  3.4  4.1  2.3  |  _2.1_._.
Start-up,  Followers  3.1  3.4  2.5  2.
:_Curet, All  3.3  _3.9_1_7  1.8
Carved Wooden  Fumnifte from Jepama  _  - ._.
-Start-up,  Pioneers  1.8  3.4  2.4  -2.0
Current,  Al  1.3  4.7  1.9  1.7
Rattan Furiture,  All  - . -_:
Start-up, Pioner  2.5  3.5  1.0  4.8
Start-up,  Followes  3.4  3.7  . 1.4  2.8
Crent,  All  j  3.1  4.3  1.1  3.1
Rattan Furniture, Non-Pribumi
Start-up,  Pioneers  :  ,  - -
Start-up, Followers  3.0  4.2  - 1.1-  2.6
Current,  All  f  2.8  4.5  1.1  2.9
Rattan  Furiture,  Pribumi  .n;n._._X
Start-up, Pioneers  2.5  . 3.5  1.0  4.8
Start-up, Followers  4.1  2.9  1.8  3.1
Current,  Al  3.6  4.1  1.1  3.317
Table 9, depended  disproportionately  on their own efforts and collective  support to penetrate
export markets.
Tuming to the high scores for buyer.  initiatives  in the current period, while in the early
1980s  Indonesia  barely had any presence  on intemadonal markets  for manufactures,
manufactures  exports subsequently  expanded at an astonishingly  rapid rate to reach $14.7
billion by 1991. By that time, like Korea but unlike Colombia, the country had achieved a high
export profile and foreign  buyers were flocking in to take advantage  of its low production.
costs. Hence the dominant  role of buyer initiatives  in the current period evident in Table 9 for
all three subsectors.
. . .~~~~~~~inr
11.2:  Cunulative Processes and the Role of Collective  Marketing  Suport
Using a simple demand  and supply framework, we summarize  the previous discussion
in a way that highlights  the sources of variation in the demand and.  use of collective  marketing
support across countries  and subsectors.  The three propositions  highlighted  earlier account for
much of the observed vzriation.
The first proposition  was that, insofar as private and collective  markeing mechanisms
are substittes,  the presence of pre-exig  private networks  at the inital stages of expansion
into export markets is an importnt deterinaniof  the demand for collective  marktii'g  suppeot.
Heuristcally, DlDl  in Figure 1 represents  those countries, subsectors  and fms  which lack
access to pre-existing  private networks and hence might demand  quite substantial  collective
marketing support, while D2D2 re-presents  countries,  .subsectors  and firms which enjoy access
to pre-existing networks  and so have less demand for collective  supporclj/  In seven subsectors
reviewed above, private networks already were in place as of the time of export entry of the
firms surveyed:
"'silverware, auto parts and textiles in Japan;
IW  Fonnally, Qd =  f(Xp,X2.....Xn), where Qd is the demand for collective  support, Xp
is the cost to te  firm of using that support, and X2-Xn are other determinants  of demand. As
the figure shows, we make the standard assumption  as to the negative  relation between  price
and quantity demanded. In the text, we explore three of potentially  many non-pnce
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* nonpribumi  garment  and  rattan  exporters  in Indonesia;
* Korea's  textile  SMEs  in the industrial  district  of Taegu;  and
* Colombia's  garment  SMEs.
By  and large, SMEs  in these  subsectors  had relatively  less  use for collective  support  than  did
SMEs  in the remaining  seven  subsectors,  where  pre-existing  private  networks  were
underdeveloped:
* pribumi  rattan  and  firniture  exporters  in Indonesia;.
* Korea's auto  parts,  eletrnic  parts,  and factory  automation  SMEs;  and
* Colombia's  leather  and  machinery  SMEs.
Evidence  from these  latter  seven  subsectors  offers  strong  support  for a second
proposition  highlighted  earlier,  namely  that  intertemporal  variations  within  individual  industie
influence  the  mechanisms  of export  marketing.  Table  9A presents  in summary  form  some  key
patterns that were evident in Tables 7-9. The data are normalized, with the average usefulness
scores  for "buyer  initiative"  set at one for each  subsector.  Each  subsector's  average  score  for
collective  marketing  support  is recalculated  as a ratio  of the "buyer  initiative  score".  Averaging
these  normalized  scores  across  subsectors  (within  counties), and across  all subsecors  and
countries  yields  the patterns  evident  in the table.
Table 9A highlights  the powerfil cumulative  processes at work in the evolution of the
mechanisms  of export  marketing.  The usefulness  of collective  marketing  relative  to buyer
initiative  is highest  for an industry's  export  pioneers  as they  sta-up  their  export  efforts,  and
then  subsequently  declines  as foreign.buyers  come  onto  the scene  and the transactional
environment  for export  marketing  'thickens", with  a corresponding  fall in the transactions  costs
of using  entirely  private  mechanisms  of export  marketing.  As  Table  9A shows,  in general  this
pattern  is evident  not  only over  the industry  life cycle  (compare  the relative  scores  at entry  for
export  pioneers  and export  followers),  but  also over  the firm  life cycle  (compare  the current
scores  versus  the scores  at entry  for all firms).  The decline  in use of collective  mechanisms  can
be illustrated  as a continuing  leftward  shift  of the demand  schedule,  DIDI in Figure  1.18a
TABLE 9A: CHANGES  IN PRIVATE  VERSUS  COLLECTIVE  MARKETING
SUPPORT  OVER  INDUSTRY  AND FIRM LIFE CYCLES  IN SEVEN  SUBSECTORS
RELATIVE  USEFULNESS  SCORES:
COLLECTIVE  SUPPORT/BUYER  INITIATIVE
Pioneer  Firms,  Follower Firms,  All Firms,
|Entry  Entry  Current
All Countries  and  1.2  0.7  0.6
SubSectors
KOREA  1.5  0.8-  0.4
INDONESIA  1.0  0.8a  0.6
COLOMBIA  0.8  0.5  0.7.
al  For Jepara, this score was estimated  as the midpoint  between  the Pioneer and
Current  Scores.19
The powerful empirical  pattern.evident  in Table 9A should  not be interpreted  as
implying  that collective  support, though evidently  helpful in the initial  stages, is a necessaly
catalyst for the take-off of a new export industry. Indeed, as is evident in Tables 7-9, only i-'-
two of the seven subsectors  - electronic  parts in Korea, and rattan exports from Indonesia  by
pribumi-owned  firms - did collective  efforts comprise  the leading source of support for export
pioneers. In three subsectors  - factory automation  in Korea, and leather  products and
machinery  in Colombia  - direct marketing  efforts by firns themselves,  were crucial to the
initial penetration  of export markets. In one subsector  (Korean auto parts) traders played the
crucial catalytic  role. And in the final subsector, exports of carved wooden furniture from
Jepara, notwithstanding  the overall pattern evident in Table 9A, buyer initiave  comprised  the
crucial catalyst.
The third proposition  highlighted  earlier was that inter-country  variations in the extent
of engagement  in the export marketplace  influence  export marketing  mechanisms.  The relevant-
comparisons  here are between  Colombia  with its relatively  low export profile on the one hand,
and Korea and Indonesia  with their higher profiles on the other. Colombia's lower export
profile, and consequenly weaker visibility  to foreign  buyers, might be hypothesized  to
correspond with a higher demand  for collective  support  - DIDI  in Figure 1, versus D2D2 for
Korean and Indonesia.  Surprisingly,  Korea's higher export  profile than Colombia's did not
translate into more foreign initiative  in the pioneering phase of SME exports in a new industry,
wit  a correspondingly  lower demand  for domestic  resources, collective  or otherwise. But, as
Table 9A summarizes, subsequent  to the initial  phase of export entry, the predicted  differences
were evident, with a sharper relative  decline in the usefulness  of collective  marketing  supports
in Korea than in Colombia. These differences  can perhaps be interpreted  as signalling the
failure  us  far of Colomnbia  to "lock-in"  its presence in the international  marketplace,  and set
in motion the cumulative  process of increased  participation  by both foreign buyers and
domestic suppliers which has proven so crucial for Korea's economic  success.
11.3:  The Delivery of Collective  Marketing  Support20
In al four country  studies,  private mechanisms  of export  marketing  support  turn out to
be more important  than collective  ones. Yet, at least  some firns, subsectors  and countries
benefit quite substantially  from the presence  of collective  marketing  support.  So, given  a policy
decision  to support SMEs, the question  arises as to how  to provide  such support.  We answer
this question  in two steps. First, we examine  what specific  kinds  of collective  support  have
proven most useful to SMEs. Thereafter,  we examine  what kinds of institutions  have proven
most effective  in delivering  this support-
Collective  support: what works?  The Colombian,  Idonesian and Korean field surveys
collected  detailed  information  from firms as to the relative  usefulness  of different  types of
collective  marketing  support for their export efforts.  Table 10 reports  the results for each
specific  type of support  that was used by at least  20% of the firms sampled  in an individual
eubsector.  The results are strikiingly  similar across  countries.
First, finms  ascnbe a high value to participation  in trade fairs at home  and abroad  as a
means  of penetrating  export  markets. Trade fairs emerged  as the leading  or second  most  valued
coliective  source of export marketing  support  in seven of the nine subsectors  for which  data are
reported in Table 10. Moreover, as we shall  see in the analysis  of tehnical support  systems,
trade fairs also turn out to be an important  source of technological  learning.
Second,  only in the garment and textile industry  (but within  that industry  systematically
in all three countries)  do frms identify  infornation on export  opporunities, rather than
participation  in trade fairs, as themost important  source of marketing  support  only in the
garment  and textile industies. This result  reminds  us that international  trade is conducted  in
different  ways for different  industries:  for some, high profile  fairs are the high points of the
trading  season, for others an ongoing  search  by individual  buyers and sellers  for trading
partners  matters  more.
Third, SMEs ascnbe very limited  value to direct intoduction of buyers  by official
export agencies.  Efforts along  these lines  played  virtually  no role in either Colombia  or
Indonesia.  In Korea, the electroics parts subsector  provides  a partial  exception  to the general
pattern  even  though it is noteworthy  that recipients  of this kind of support  (every  single one20a
TABLE 10:  COLLECTIVE  MARKETING  SUPPORT: WHAT WORKS?
A: AVERAGE  USEFULNESS  FOR ALL RESPONDENTS
B:  SERVICE  USERS  AS PERFECTAGE  OF RESPONDENTS
C:  AVERAGE  USEFULNESS  FOR USERS  ONLY
(I  =  LEAST  USEFUL;  5  MOST  USEFUL)
TRADE  FAIR  TRADE  FAIR  INFORMATION  ON  INTRODUCE
ABROAD  HOME  EXPORT  1  BUYERS
__  __  __  __  __OPPORTUNMES
COLOMBIA  ._-:_-._:-_
Leather  A  2.7  3.1  1.8
B  53%  68%  41%.
C  4.3  4.1  2.9  .
Gannent  A  2.2  2.5  2.5  1.7
B  40%  49%  60%  34%
C  _4.0  3.9  3.5  3.1
Machinery  A  2.8  - 2.8  1.9  1.5
. - - B  57%  - 64%  41%  32%
C  4.1  3.9  3.2  2.6
INDONESIA  . . . _._  -_____
Rattan  Furniture  A  3.0  2.7  1.9  1.9
B  58%  76%  33%  52%
C  4.3  3.2  2.4  2.8
Garments  A  1.8  1.9  2.0  1.7
B  34%  50%  53%  28%
C  3.3  2.8  2.9  3.4
KOREA  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Wovea Textiles  A  - - 1.8
B  - - 32%
C  - - 3.5  -
Auto Parts  A  - - T  1.5
B  - - 25%
C  - - 2.9
Electronic  Parts  A  1.6  2.0  .1.7  2.9
B  20%  -40%  27%  100%
c  *3.,9  3.5  3.5  .2.9
Factory  Automation  A  2.4  2.2  2.4  1.8
B  50%  50%  57%  43%
C  3.9  3-5  3.5  2.9.21
of the sample  finnsl)  ascribe  it only  moderate  value.  The Korea  Trading  Company  played  an
exceedingly  limited  role. For all that  its explicit  mandate  was to serve  as the "general  trading
company'  for SMEs,  orny  4 of 72 direct  Korean  exporters  in the sample  actually  made  their
export  sales  through  its channels!
Collective  support:  who  should  provide?  Any  suggestion  that  governments  should
support  the collective.  provision  of marketing  support  has to confront  the reality  that the
institutional  capability  to deliver  such  support  is weak  in most  developing  countries.  Indeed,  the
developing  world  is littered  with  failed  export  support  programs  and  'white  elephant'  export
institutions.
The hopeful  message  of the present  study  is that  there  may  be instituional  alternatives
to elaborate  export  agencies.  The empirical  evidence  highghts the benefits  of interventions
with  a "light  touch' that  provide  firms  with  the  wherewithal  to find  buyers  for themselves,
rather  than  attempt  to substitute  for efforts  by putatve exporters.  Moreover,  the evidence
suggests  that  the delivery  of export  marketing  support  might  usefully  be decentralized,  tailored
to the specific  realities  of individual  marketplaces  so as to be able  to respond  to the enormous
diversity  of players  and  market  mechnisms  across  subsectors.
All  three country  studies  offer  empirical  support  for the  proposition  that  delivery  of
export  marketin support  to SMEs  should  be decentralized..Z  Korea's  flagship  export  agency,
KOTRA,  has developed  elaborate  .export  information  systems,  multiple  tools.  for promoting
national  exporters,  and  extensive  international  networks  of offices.  Yet as Table  11 sihws,
aside  from  the electronics  subsector,  there  is virtually  no difference  in the extent  of support.
provided  by  KOTRA  and  by industry  associations.jl/  Of 72 direct  exporters  included  in the
sample,  29 reported  using  KOTRA's  services,  and  23 reported  receiving  support  from  their
12/  In Japan,  too, industry  associations  and  chambers  of commerce.  were  the.  primary
direct  channels  of export  marketing  support  for those  few firms  who  sought  to market  directly.
-B! - It is worth  noting  explicitly  that  no  judgernent  is intended  here  as to the nett  benefits.
to Korea  of KOTRA,  whose  goals  went  well  beyond  providing  support  specifically  for SMEs.
The  point  is rather  that a KOTRA-like  agency  is not  necessary  for the effective  provision  of
SME support.21a
TABLE  11: THE  RELATIVE  USEFULNESS  OF EXPORT  MARKETING  SERVICES
OF  INDUSTRY  ASSOCIATIONS
AND  NATIONAL  EXPORT  AGENCIES  IN KOREA
Average  Score  Number  of users  Average  Score
.____________  :  _________  ._________  _ l  (all firms)  . . (Users)  _.  _  . - |
Number  Number  of  KOTRA  Associa-.  KOTRA  Associa-  KOTRA  Associa-
of Firms  Exporters  tion  tion  tion
Woven  42  31  1.  15  8  - 9  3.4  3.2
Textiles
Auto  Parts  20  14  1.2  1.3  4  4  1.8  2.5
Electronic  20  15  1.7  1.2  8  I  2.8  5.0
Parts 
Factory  40  12  1.5  1.5  .9  9  3.4  3.1
Automation  X  . L  L  :-
TOTAL  122  72  _  _-  1  29 ..  3.0  3.122
trade  association.  Moreover,  the average  rating  of the  value  of the services  of the two  sets of
suppliers  was virtually  identical.
The Indonesian  experience  offers  three  lessos - one cautionary,  one niixed  and one
hopeful.-  The cautionary  lesson  concerns  the role of centralized  export  institutions.  Like  many
other  developing  countries,  Indonesia  erected  in the 1970s  two elaborate  export  institutions  -
NAFED,  whose  prime  responsibility  is to promote  trade  fairs  with  Indonesian  participation,
and the Iternational Trade  Promotion  Center,  an international  network-  of commercial  offices
located  in Indonesian  embassies  abroad.  Yet  by 1985,  fairs  aside,  the perception  was
widespread  that  these  insftituons  were  of limited  usefulness.
The mixed  lesson  concerns  the role of industry  associations.  Parts  of Indonesia's
furniture  and  garment  associations  emerged  in the firm  surveys  as useful  sources  of collective
support.  Yet in general  Indonesia's  industry  associations  tend  to be exceedingly  weak.  They  are
not professionally  staffed;  they  are rarely  accountable  to their  members;  they  tend  to be'
captured  by powerful  players  in their  industries;  and  their  umbrella  organization  lacks  credible
autonomy  from  government.  As  the country  study  makes  clear,  it will  be no simple  matter  to
re-orient  a substantial  number  of the country's  industry  associations  to play  a constructive
- promotional  role  .......
The hopeful  lesson  concerns  the experience  of the Export  Support  Board,  created  in
1985  in response  to the perception  of filure of the  exisdng  export  institutions.  The ESB
represents  an intriguing  departure  from  the institutional  model  adopted  earlier in that  its role
was  to finance  marketing  support,  not  deliver  it directly:  it provided  partial subsidies  to nascent
exporters  who  sought  to participate  in trade fairs  abroad,  to develop  export  promotional
material,  and (as discussed  farther  under  the rubric  of technical  support  systems)  to employ
technical  consultants  from  abroad.  Its complement  of professional  staff never  exceeded  10
persons,  yet its services  were more  widely  used,  and  were rated  more  highly  among  the firms
surveyed,  than  those  provided  by the elaborate,  central  export  edifices.23
-The  performance  of Colombia's  national  export  agency,  PROEXPO  (created  in 1967),
in providing  direct  marketing  support  to firns also  has been  less  than  impressive.2/ Relatively
few  of the Colombian  firms  which  used  collective  support  (Table  10),  reported  that it came
from PROEXPO.  The industry  associations,  by contrast,  show  considerable  promise  in this
area, especially  those  in the leather  and  (more  recently)  garments  industries.  Working  closely
witi their member  firms,  these  industry  associations  are developing  the sort  of sector-specific
knowledge  and  skills  which  cannot  realistically  be expected  from  general  purpose  agencia like
PROEXPO.  A successful  hybrid  form  which  is beginning  to take  hold  is for PROEXPO  and
other  public  sector  agencies  to work  collaboratively  with industry  associations  - with  the public
agencies  providing  some  funding  to help  organize  fairs and  assist  visits  abroad  by potential
exporters.
11.4:  public  Policy  towards  Expor Markting.
For decades,  countries  have  used  high  profile  national  export  agencies  to support  their
export  efforts.  Compartive  empirical  analysis  in Indonesia,  Japan,  Korea  and Colombia
suggests  that,  viewed  from  the SME  perspective,  and  judging  by the experience  of successful
exporters,  initiatives  along  these  lines  may  be misplaced.  For one  thing,  private  networks  tum
out  to be the dominant  means  whereby  SMEs  enter  into  cxport  markets.  For anotcb*r,  for the
subgroups  of firms  for whom  collective  marketing  support  has proven  to be useful,  it has
generaLly  been  of a kind  that  can more  effectively  be provided  by decentralized  organizations
such  as industry  associations,  or local  govermnents  and  chambers  of commerce.  Whether  these
decentralized  organizations  indeed  provide  useful  support  to SMEs  appears  to depend  in part,
however,  on whether  tiey are dominated  by large  finns, or whether  SMEs  have  a significant
voice.  A number  of levels  of government  plausibly  could  play  a usefully  role in facilitating  the
development  of decentralized  organizations  capable  of sponsoring  participation  in fairs and -
offering  SMEs  other  forms  of effective  marketing  support.
12/  Although  note  that  its primary  focus  has been  on the  provision  of credit  for exporters,
an activity  which  it apparently  has undertaken  impressively.24
Turning  specifically  to national  authorities,  aside  from  facilitating  a supportive  business
and incentive  enviroment for exporting,  is their appropriate  role in supporting  export
marketing?  One  task is to "market  the country"  - to raise  international  awareness  of the
potential  advantages  of doing  business,  including  export  business,  with  the emergig export
nation.2Q/  What  emerges  from  t'lis study  is that  a case  can also  be made  to encourage  through
partial  subsidies  - as opposed  to directly  deliver  - the use of export  marketing  supports.
Consideration  could  also  be given  to using  the lure of financial  support  to encourage  the
development  of decentralized  delivery  of export  marketing  senrices  - to facilitate  the
establishment  of subsector  specific  industry  associations  that  are responsive  to SME  concerns,
to encourage  those  that  function  primarily  as lobbying  organizations  to develop  the capability  to
provide  export  marketing  and  other  services  to their members,  or to encourage  the emergence
of private  providers  of export  marketing  services,  including  for-profit  sponsors  of trade  fairs.
Finally,  looking  beyond  specific  collective  services,  public  policy  may  have  some  role
to play  in nurturing  the private  networks  that  have  emerged  in this comparative  study  as the
bedrock  of export  marketing  efforts.  Although  not studied  in any depth,  the case  studies
uncovered  tanalizng hints  of pr-active goverment efforts  to promote  such  networks:  public
support  for the development  of private  trading  companies  in Korea  and, earlier,  in Japan;
Japanese  legislation  to protect  the iterests of smal firms  embedded  in subcontractng
relationships;  actions  in Korea  to designate  specific  lines  of business  for subcontracting  rather
than  vertically  integrated  production.  To be sure, as is documented  by both the individual  case
studies  and the volrmniinous  literatre on the  determinants  of inter-firm  contacting
arrangementss,2J/  the development  of these  networks  has largely  been  the result  of spontaneous-
private  forces,  often  deeply  rooted  in national  history  and  culture.  Yet, insofar  as incentives
can encourage  subcontracting  or entry  by export  traders  (both  large  and small)  the opporunities
2Q/  For a detailed discussion  of how to proceed with this task, see Wells and Wint (1990).
2  L1/  - For one  key contrbution,  see  Williamson  (1985).
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for SMEs to participate in export-  markets would be substantially  enhanced, with significant
social returns.
-- m: 
Developing new products and acquiring new production capabilities, and improving
upon those that a firm already has at its disposal, are crucial to success in export markets and in
all four countries most of the SMEs surveyed reported substantial technical improvements. One
important influence on technical effort and perfonnance is the extent to which policies expose
firms to domestic or international competition, and thereby act as a spur to improve
capabilities. Another important influence comprises education  policy, including importantly
education in science and engineering, and its impact on the supply of technologically-usefil
human capital. Also influendtal  are management processes within finns and their impact on on-
the-job technological learning (including through reverse engineering).
The present study focuses on a fourth influence, namely the micro-environment of
private, governmental and NGO market and institutional  technological supports external to the
finr,  on which it can draw as it seeks to build technological capability. A central goal is to
evaluate the impact of collective technical supports. In principle, their impac-t  could be
substantial: inter-firm spillovers of knowledge are pervasive, so individual  firms do not capture
for themselves all the benefits of their investments in knowledge, and in the absence of
solutions to classic problems of collective action may rationally underinvest. However, the
challenges of collective provision can also be substntial,  since for information  to be useful, ik
may need to be tailored to the specific needs of an individual industry, if not an individual fum.
Moroever, as with export marketing, there exists a variety of external private mechanisms
which support a firm's technological  effort. Consequently, we embed our analysis of collective
technical support within the broader context of the range of private and collective mechanisms
which can aid technological effort.
Three broad categories of external technological support can be distinguished.-  The first
category comprises technological  learing  that occurs as a byproduct of a firm's transactions categor  copie:e-crn26
with its buyers and suppliers. The second category comprises technological learning that is
facilitated by a firm's being embedded in an "information-rich" environment, one replete with
other firms engaged in similar activities, with a menu of courses that address its specific
business problems, and with access to a network of specialized consultants. The final category
comprises "high-intensity"  technological  support, including formal technology transfer
agreements with other private finms engaged in a similar line of business, and sustained  joint
work with specialist technology institutions. Note that while the channels for leaniing in the
first category are entirely private, in the latter two categories the channels might be either
private or collective.
We first review comparatively the empirical results from the four country studies as to-
which sources proved most useful in helping finns to acqWire  technological capability.
Thereafter, we evaluate in some depth the specific role of collective technological  support.
M.  1 Leading Sources of Technological  Capability
Five of the subsectors (garments in Indonesia and Colombia, both fiurniture  subsectors
in Indonesia, and leather products in Colombia) use craft-based technologies; two (woven
textiles in Korea and Japan) use simple, engineering-based  technologies; and five (machinery in
Colombia, automotive components  in Korea and Japan, and electronic products and factory
automation equipment in Korea) are examples of more complex, engineering-based
technologies.2=/ While craft-based and engineering-based  activities pose distinct technological
challenges, each can be met in distinctive ways. Indeed, as the comparative review which
follows will highlight, and for reasons that are closely analogous  to those identified earlier for
export marketing, there turn out to be distinctive national patterns in the external mechanism
of technological support for both craft- and engineering-based  activities.
Japan. As Table 12A reveals, the leading external sources of technological capability
are remarkably similar for Japan's silverware, woven textile and auto parts SMEs, despite very
substantial subsectoral differences in the technological  challenges. Paralleling export marketing,
- 22/  Japan's silverware subsector is a hybrid, with strong roots as a craft-based industry
but with increasing application of science-based  technologies  to -sustain competitive advantage.27
vertical relations with large finms emerge as a crucial source of external capability in all dtree
subsectors: chemical companies and (to a lesser extent) trading houses are crucial sources of
technological capability for woven textile SMEs; and silverware and auto parts SMEs receive
important technologicial  support from their immediate  principals in the multi-tier
subcontracting chain.
More broadly, the Japan study highlights the power of inter-firm flows of information
within industrial districts as an important source of technological  capability. All three
subsectors dominated  the economic base of a narrow geographical area - silverware in
Tsubame city, synthetic woven textiles in Fukui-Ishikawa  prefecture and auto parts in Ohta
city. Vertical linkages represent one example of inter-firm information flows in these industial
districts. In addition, Table 12A identifies similar firms and public agencies (organized, as
discussed further below, at the district level) as useful sources of capability. And equipment
suppliers - many of which are themselves located within the specialized, product-centered
industrial districts  - emerge in all three subsectors as an external source of technological
capability second only to subcontracting  principals.
Indonesia. Interactions with the intemational marketplace emerge in Table 12B as the
most important source of technological  capability for Indonesian SMEs. While both pnbumi
and non-pribumi firms have thus gained technologically  from export expansion, Table 12B also
points to distinctive advantages enjoyed by non-pnbumi fins.  In both the rattan and garments
subsectors, expatriate employees play a disproportionately  important role as a source of
technological capability for non-pribuin finns vis-a-vis their pribumi counterparts. While half
of the non-pnbumi users recruited expatriates from Hong Kong and Taiwan, both Chinese
centers, no_pnbumi users drew expatriates from these sources. Pribumi firms rely
disproportionately on substitute channels of technical leaming. For furniture finns (both rattan
producers and those from Jepara), technical literature has played an important role. As for
pribumi gdrment firms (whose role in the garment industry is an exceedingly small one), Table
12B suggests that they have not reaped any direct technological  benefits from Indonesia's
export success, but instead rely on the local diffusion of technological capability by private27a
TABLE 12: LEADING EXTERNAL  SOURCES  OF TECHNOLOGICAL  UPGRADING
(AVERAGE  USEFULNESS  SCORE FOR ALL FIRMS  - BRACKETS:  I - LEAST IMPORTANT;
5 - MOST IMPORTANT)
I____________  PRIVATE  SOURCES  COLLECTIVE  SOURCES
I LEADING  I  SECOND  THIRD SOURCE  PUBLIC  I  INDUSTRY
. ______.___.j  SOURCE  ISOURCE  '  AGENCY  ASSOCIATION
A:  JAPAN  ._._._.  _._
Silverware  Subcontracting  Equipment  Supplier  Similar Firms (1.7)  1.8  1.4
Principal  (2.5)  (1.8)  _  :
Woven  Textiles  Subcontracting  Equipment  Supplier  - 2.0  1.0
Principal  (4.0)  (2.9)
Auto Parts  Equipment  Supplier  Subcontracting'  Similar Firms (1.6)  1.5  1.4
.______________  _  -(2.8)  Principal  (2.7)  . . . '  . . .
B:  INDONESIA
Rattan  Buyers (3.6)  Expatriate  (3.4)  Similar  Firms (2.3)  1.0.  1.7
(NonPribumi)  .'  Employees  ,  ._._._  ._  .
.Rattan  (Pribumi)  Buyers (3.6)  Technical  Expatriate  (2.1)  1.5  2.1
literature (2.6)  Employees
Garments  Buyers (3.0)  Expatriate  (3.0)  Technical  1.0  . 1.0
(NonPribumi)  Employees  Literature  (2.2)  . . . . .
Garments  Similar  Firms (3.8)  Subcontracting  Equipment  (3.0)  1.0  1.0
(Pribumi)  (3.3)
Jcpara  Buyers (3.2)  Technical  Subcontracting  1.1  1.7
Literatur. (2.0)  (1.8)  ._._.__
C:  KOREA
Woven  Textiles  Similar  Firns (2.4)  Buyers (2.0)  Equipment  1.4  1.2
._____________  _  .Suppliers  (1.8)
Auto Parts  Subcontracting  Formal  Technology  Equipment  2.6  1.1
Principal  (3.7)  Transfer (2.6)  Suppliers  (2.4)
Electronic  Parts  International  '  Equipment  Subcontracting  1.5  1.2
Exhibition  (3.0)  Suppliers  (2.3)  Principals  (2.0)  . .
Factory  International  Buycrs (1.8)  Foreign  2.1  1.2
Automation  Exhibition  (2.2)  Professionals  (1.7):
Formal Technology
Transfer (1.7)  .
D:  COLOMBIA  '
Leather  Foreign  Buyers  Equipment  Similar Firms (2.4)  1.1  T  2.1
- a-n  (2.7)  Suppliers  (2.6)
Garments  Equipmnent  Technical  Similar Firms (2.1)  1.3  2.0
Suppliers  (3.0)  Literature  (2.3)  _  . - |  . - _  .
-Machinery  Technical  Equipment  Local Buyers (2.5)  2.0  1.6
Literature (3.9)  Suppliers  (2.9)  _  _  . . * 28
participants  in the  industrial districts  where  much. of Indonesia's  garnent  export industry  is
located.2N
Kwsa. In both Japan  and Indonesia  the leading external  mechanisms  of technological
capability  are those with which  SMEs  interact  as a by-product  of their core  business  activities.
By contrast,  as Table  12C summarizes,  only among  Korea's  auto parts  SMEs do  vertical.
linkages  with procuring  principals  emerge  as anywhere  near  as important  a source  of
technological  capability as they  are in Japan.241 Instead,  for the three  subsectors  with relatively
complex  technological  requirements  (that is, all but woven textiles),  a disproportionately  large
number  of leading  extemal  mechanisms  involve the transfer  of technological  capabilities  from
abroad,  with the transfer  requiring  conscious  technological  effort by  firms.  Thus:
*  international  exhibitions  are the most important  external  source  of capability
in both the electronic  parts and factory  automation  subsectors;
*  formal technology  transfer  agreements  are among  the three  most important
private  external  sources  in both the auto parts  and factory automation
subsectors;  and
*  moonlighting  over  weekends by Japanese  engineers  is an important  source  of
capability  for  the factory  automation  subsector.
Also noteworthy  is support  from public  agencies,  which  is the second  most imporant  external
support  in both  the auto parts  and factory automation  subsectors.
Overall,  Korea's  strategy  of technology  acquisition  in the three  complex  subsectors
appears  strikingly purposeful,  both at the firm and the industry level. Viewed  against the
backdrop  of the Japanese  experience,  these purposeful  efforts  to learn from  abroad  can be
interpreted  as a substitute for the relative  weakness  of vertical  inter-firm  relations  as a channel
for  technological  learning.
231  Garment  production  for exports  is concentrated  in Bandung  (where  it is the dominant
industry)  and in Jakarta,  both  in West Java.
24/  The relatively  weak performance  of subcontracting  as a channel of leaming  for  Korea
vis  a vis Japan  has been observed  by Porter  (1990);  see also Kang and Park  (1990) and  Joo
Hoon  Kiin (1991).29
Even for woven textiles, where technology is simpler, it is noteworthy that vertical
relations with buyers emerge in Table 12C as nowhere near as important  for Korean SMEs as
they are for SMEs in comparable industries  in the other countries. Rather, horizontal linkages
among firms in the textile industrial  district of Taegu are most useful.
Colombia. By comparison  with Japan and Indonesia, Colombia's SMEs receive
strikingly little support from buyers downstream.  While in Korea, too, the evidence pointed to
weak vertical ties, unlike Korea, Colombian  filns  do not appear to have purposefully  used
substitute  private mechanisms  to learn from abroad. Rather, the overall picture in Table 12D is
one of rather ad hoc pattems of technological  learning. This overall sense of technological
isolation is moderated  somewhat  by evidence in the table of horizontal inter-firm flows of
information  among garment and leather firms, and of some significant  technological  support
role on the part of industry associations  (on which more below).
Overview. In all four countries, private rather than collective  mechanisms  emerge as
the leading external sources of technological  capability. Yet, underlying  this aggregate
similarity  there are substantial  cross-country (and crosssectoral) differences in mechanisms of
technological  acquisition.  While our Inmber of subsectoral observations  is limited (especially
given the need to distinguish  between craft-based and engineering-based  activities), we
nonetheless  find it heuristically  useful to identify in Table 13 distinctive country  patterns of
tchnological  acquisition.
Paralleling export marketing, a striking feature of Table 13 is the influence  of country
"endowments"  on the mechanisms  of technological  acquisition  by SMEs. In Japan, strong
vertical and horizontal inter-finn relations drive the technology acquisition  process. In
Indonesia, the crucial drivers are international  linkages,  both longstanding  ones within an
extended Chinese  community  and the more recent inflow of foreign buyers. In Taegu, Korea
(which apparently is something  of an exception  on the Korean scene)  horizontal linkages  within
an industrial district play an important  role.
Where endowments  are limited, the challenge  of technological  acquistion is a
formidable  one, and as Colombia's machinery industry illustrates, the consequence can be29a
TABLE 13: MECHANISMS  OF EXTERNAL  TECHNICAL  SUPPORT
IN FOUR COUNTRIES - AN OVERVIEW
CRAFT-BASED  ENGINEERING-BASED
ACTIVITIES  ACTIVITIES
JAPAN  Vertical  inter-firm  relations  Vertical  inter-firm  relations
:_______________________  -plus  industrial district  plus industrial district
INDONESIA  Linkages  through
international marketplace  ._:_  _
KOREA  Horizontal  flows within  Activist  Technology
industrial  district  strategies  at firm and
_______  _______  ______  _______  _______  ______  industry  level
COLOMBIA  Limited industrial  district  Ad Hoc Technological
:____A  ____:  ________-__  phenomenon  Learning30
technological  isolation  and ad hoc  learning.  Yet the experiences  of both  Korea's engineering-
based  SMEs,  and (to a lesser  extent)  Colombia's  craft-based  leather  and garment  SMEs  suggest
that it is possible  to successfully  surmount  this  challenge  via activist  strategies  at both die firm
and collective  level,  It is to this collective  dimension  of the technology  acquisition  process  to
-which  we now  trm.
III.2: Collective  Techical Support:  Its DeMn=d  and  Us
Private  and collective  mechanisms  of technical  support  can be viewed  as partial
substitutes.  SMEs  might  be hypothesized  to initially  meet  their technological  needs  internally,
as a by-product  of their core  business  activities,  or through  existing  business  contacts.  Only  if
they  still  perceive25/  unmet  technological  needs  are they  likely  to demand  collective  technical
support.  Thus,  building  on the previous  section:
*  Demand  for collective  support  is likely  to be higher  the  more complex  are the
technological  requirements  of production  - lowest  for craft-based  technologies,
higher  for simple  engineering  technologies,  and  higher stil for complex
engineering  technologies.
D*  emand  for collective  support  is likely  to be higher  the weaker  are the
country-  and industial organization-related  "endowments"  of private
technological  networks  available  to a firm.
A straightforward  extension  of these  hypotheses  is that, within  a given  subsector,  there can be
variations  in the technology-related  endowments  of individual  SMEs,  with the demand  for
collective  technical  support  greater  for poorly-endowed  firms.Zg 
251  There  is abundant  evidence  that many  technologically  primitive  firms  do not  perceive
their own  limitations.  See, for example,  evidence  from  Sri Lanka  and Tanzania  in Levy
(1993).
2Xt  Viewed  in relation  to the first  hypothesis,  it might  be argued  that  the relevant  variable
is technological  complexity  relative  to a firm's internal  capabilities,  and thus  that  demand  for
collective  technical  support  will  be greater  for firms  with  weaker  capabilities.  Viewed  in
relation  to the second  hypothesis,  SMEs  within  a given  subsector  might  plausibly  vary in their.
access  to private  technological  networks,  and hence  in their  demand  for colective  technical
support.31
Evidence  in the country  studies  enables  us to group  our country-subsector  observations
to correspond  with the three  schedules  of demand  for collecdve  technical  support  depicted  in
Figure  2:
'Demand is lowest  (i.e. corresponds  with DiDl) for SMEs  in the six Japanese
and Indonesian  subsectors  studied,  and for Korca's  woven  textile  SMEs.  Their
technologies  are relatively  simple,  and they  have  good access  to private
technological  supports  (among  Indonesian  firms,  especially  so for the non-
pribumi).
* Demand  is somewhat  higher  (i.e. corresponds  with D2D2)  in Colombia's  two
craft-based  subsectors.  While  technologies  are relatively  simple,  their access  to
private  technological  supports  is weaker  than  for their  Indonesian  and Japanese
counterparts.
* Demand  is highest  (i.e. correspords  with  D3D3)  for Colombia's  machinery
SMEs,  and for SMEs  in Korea's three  engineering  based  subsectors.
Additionally,  within  individual  subsectors,  smaller  and less-well-connected  fims might  be
hypothesized  to be on a higher  demand  schedule  than  their  larger  counterparts.
As will  be discussed  furtiher  below,  there  also  are subsuntial  cross-country  (and  cross-
sectoral)  variations  in the supply  capabilities  of collective  instutions. Consequently,  there  can
be formidable  identification  problems  in distngushing  between  supply-side  and demand-side
explanations  for cross-country  (and  cross-sectoral)  differences  in the use of collective  technical-
support..
Demand-side  variations  alone  seem  sufficient  to account  for two  of the empirical
paterns observed.  First, as is evident  in Table  12C, mi  Korea  collective  tehical  support  was
valued  most  highly  for the technologically-complex  automotive  parts and factory  automation
subsectors,  and least  highly  for the technologically-straightforward  woven  textile  subsector,  a
pattem  which  is consistent  with  the first  hypothesis  presented  above.  Second,  both the
Colombian  and Indonesian  case  studies  present  evidence  that  within  individual  subsectors
collective  technical  support  was more  highly  valued  by firms  which  were "marginal'  at start-
p. Thus,-  in Indonesia's rattan and wood furniture  bsectors, colective technical supports
were utlized disproportionately  by smaller pnbi  firms  with less-educated  entrepreneurs,
- :,  -ffthough  even  for this group  the role of colective  supports  has  been modest.  In Colombia31a
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Use  of Collective  Technical  Support32
colective support was more highly valued by the smaller leather firms - with the avenge
usefulness  score declining  monotonically  from 3.0 for the smallest firms to 1.0 for the largest.
In both lndonesia and Colombia, the field surveys uncovered  substantial subsequent  success,
.including  export success, by these initially "marginal" firms.
On the supply-side,  evidence presented in the next subsection  suggests  that it is
reasonable as a first approximation  to distinguish  between  three supply schedules:
* SISi, corresponding  to Indonesia, whose institutional  capabilities  to supply
.support appear weakest  among the four countries studied;
* S252, corresponding  to Colombia, which appears to have an intermediate
level of collective  supply capability;  and
* M3M3,  corresponding  to Korea and Japan, where the institutional  capabilities
for collective  supply are strongest.
As is illustrated in Figure 2, taken together the above propositions  as to supply and demand
IMPly  that, among the countries and subsectors studied, the use of collective  technical support
will be highest for SMEs in Korea's three engineering-based  subsectors, and will be lowest for
Indonesian  finns (especially  the non-pribumi).22/  By and large, this pattem is evident in Table
12.
M--.3:  The Delivery of Collective  SuDport
Colective technical support takes on one of two very different forms. It can be "broad-
based", and work to facilitate  the emergence of an "information-rich"  environment.
Alternatively,  it can try to promote  "high-intensity"  technological  learning  by supplying
technical inputs direcdy to firns.  While it is reasonably straightforward  to distinguish  between
the supply of "broad-based"  and of "high-intensity"  support for Colombia, Indonesia and
Japan, the two tpes  of support are provided  jointly in Korea. Consequently,  the Korean
experience is presented separately.
22/  The relative importance  of collective  technical support among  the remaning seven
subsectors  depends on the magnitudes  of shifts in demand and supply schedules, and hence
cannot be depicted unambiguously.32a
TABLE 14: THE USEFULNESS OF BROAD-BASED  COLLECTIVE TECHNICAL
SUPPORT IN SELECTED SUBSECTORS  AND COUNTRIES
COUNTRY-SUBSECTOR  USERS/  AVERAGE  NUMBER OF FIRMS SCORING
I  . ~~~~~~~RESPONDENTS  SCORE AMONG;. 
__________________.  _  USERS  3.-4.  OR 5  4 OR 5
INDONESIA  :  ._._-_.__
RATTAN
Courses  - 15/33
Industry Association  15/33  -3.1  10  5
Consultnts  9/33  3.0  5  4
JEPARA
Courses  12/24
Industry Association  13/24  2.2  5  3
COLOM  BIA  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
LEATHER  PRODUCTS
Courses  21/34
Industry Association  17134  3.2  1-  7
GARMENTS
Courses  32142  .
Collective Providers  20142  3.4  9
MACHINERY
Courses  27144  .
Public Technology Agency  16144  3.8  7
Product Standards Agency  12/44  3.5  8
JAPAN
TSUBAMEfSILVERWARE
Technical Cemter  18/36  2.5  10  4
Industry Association  13135  2.2  6  2
FUKUI/TEXTILES
Technical Center  14/29  3.0  8  7
Industry Association  3/30  3.7  2  2
OHTAIAUTO PARTS
Technical Center  6/33  3.8  5  4
Industry Association  5130.  3.2  2  233
Broad-based  collective  sport  in  noesi.  Colomia AnB p.  "Broad-baed"
collective  support  works  to enhance  the overall availability  of usable informaifon,  leaving  firms
to judge what infonnation  sources  might be most  useful, and how  they might  be adapted  to a
firm's specific  needs.  Examples  include:  sponsoring  courses  oa specialized  topics;  facilitating
theu  use of specialized  consultants  (either  directly  by making  a consultant  available  to a broad
array of finns, or indirectly  by providing  financial  support  for the use of consultants);  and
promoting  information-sharing  among  firms. Supports  along  these  lines  are relevant  across  all
levels of technological  complexity,  and the institutional  demands  of provision  are relatively
light. As Table 14 summarizes, such support was used  -and  reported to be quite useful -in
Indonesia,  Colombia  and Japan.
In Indonesia,  just under half (27 of 57) of the finns surveyed  in the rattan  and carved
wooden  furniture  subsectors  attended  courses  that focused  on specific  technical  subjects
relevant  to their businesses  (e.g. wood-drying  and finishing).  Virually all of these were
offerings  by the fmuniture  industry  association  (ASMINDO)  or by independent  non-
governmental  organizations,  and about  half of the participant gave  a score of the  or higher
to collective  support  as a source of technological  capabilit. Use of technical  consultants  was
confined  to less  than twenty  percent of the firns. However,  half of the users gave scores  of
four or five  to the support provided  by consultants  - and eighty  percent of the users reported
that the costs  of using consulting  support  were at least  partially  subsidized  by collective
providers.
There was more diversity  in Colombia  in the sources  of broad-based.  collective  support,
althoLgh  courses  predominated.  In leather  products,  the collective  lead  has been  taken by a
dynamic  industry  association,  ASOCUEROS,  which  has off-ers  a wide variety  of courses,
sponsors  technical  consultants,  and in general  encourages  networldng  and information-sharing
among  firms. Half of the 34 leather  finrs received  technical  support  from.ASOCUEROS,  and
seven firms  (o,yer  twenty  percent  of the sample)  gave  this support  a usefulness  score of 4 or 5.
In the garment  industry,  over dthe-fourths of the finns sampled  had taken  technical  courses
relevant  to the business  -wiih  the leading  poviders being  the national  training  organization,34
SENA, the economy-wide  small business  association,  ACOPI, and the garmnit industry
association.  The non-electrical  machinety  industry is technologicaly  more complex  dun the
others and, perhaps reflecting  this differmce, specialist  technology  agencios  rat  than
industy associations  emerge as the leading  collective  providers. However, even for this
subsector, courses (rather dn  high-intesity support) emerge as dte dominant  source of
coUective  support, with SENA  the leading  provider.2&!
In Japan, tchnical centers under the umbrella  of local govemenmts  are the primary
providers of broad-based  collective  technical  support. Their role was most significant  in two of
the three subsectors  surveyed,29t  where (as Table 14 shows)  about half the rms surveyed used,
their services, with 56% of these conferring  upon them a usefulnes score of 3 or higher. While
in the past the technical  centers also provided  high-intensity  support, at present their effors-
appear largely to be confined  to sponsoring  courses. providing  test  and inspection  services,
and providing  assistn  on caummon  technical  problems  that aise from normal business
practices, including  a modest  nmmber  of firm visits.
A further  filmctioh  oa Japan's collective  technical  support system  - difficult  to measure
but, by all accounts, very useful  - is as a node in an iformationu-ch networtl The Japan
silverware case study includes  one  especially  vivid example  of how ths network functions.  A
Tsubame entrepreeu  came up with the idea of making silverware  with handles  whose shape
could adjust  to fit the needs of individual  disabled  users. The collective  support network (in this
instance the local business  asscation)  helped  him identify a range of semia  and exhibitions
held throughout  Japan which plausibly  could  provide b  with useful informaton. Evetally
he came upon a company  which was developing  precisy  the mtrial  he needed for his
2-1 -Intrestinly,  27% of the Colombian  machinery  firms sampled  (12 of44j also repod
support from Columbia's  product standards  certification  agency  - with an aerage  usefulness
score among users of 3.5. There was no evidence  of sundards agenies playningany  usefil role
in Indonesia.  These agencies appantly  are  important  in both Korea and Japan - however,
ffieir  roles were not eamined systematically  in the Korean and Japanese  case studies.
- 221  -In the third subsef  r - auto  parts in Ohta - only 18% of firms sureyed  (6  of 33)
used the center; however, the average  usefulness  score for these six users was 3.8.;35
product.  However  the company  was part of a large  group.  Ordinarily,  such  a company  would
have  had little  incentive  to work  with  a small  Tsubamne  firm.  Again,  however,  collective
support  providers  (in  this  case  a public  research  center)  intervened  to help  open  doors.  The
product  was successfully  developed,.  has won  several  awards  for innovation,  and  is being
marketed  successfuly.
Overall,  a conisteint  feature  in Indonesia,  Colombia  and  Japan  was that  broad-based
collective  support  was  most  effectively  delivered  by decentralized  institutions  - either  by
industry  associations,  independent  non-governmenta  organizations,  or by local  governments  in
specialized  industral  districts.  The  record  of centralized  institutions  in deliverin services  was
more  uneven.  Financing,  though,  sometimes  was provided  by center  institutions  - the  Export
Support  Boad (for  technical  consultant)  in Indonesia,  the central  government  mn  Japan,  and
PROEXPO  in Colombia.  This  pattern  of central  finacing and  decentraized  delivery  reflect
the wide  diversity  across  activities  in the kind  of information  that  is useful,  and  consequendy
the need  for deliverers  of broad-based  collective  technical  support  to be close  to - and imfmila
with  the needs  of  - reasonably  homogenous  client  groups.
Hig-inenitytecnial  uport in Colombia.  Indonesia  and  Japan.  TIhe  goal  of high-
intenity collective  support  is to meet  those  specific  technological  needs  of finns  .which  are not
adequately  addressed  through  other  channels.  Demand  for support  along  these  lines  is likely  to
emerge  only  at relatively  substantial  levels  of technological  complexity.  Simiilarly,-  the
insitLtional  demands  of supplying  usefu high-intnsity  support  are likely  to be substatial.- the
collective  agency  supplying  such  support  needs  to have  more  competence  on
very specific  problems  (at  quite  sophisticated  levels  of technology)  than  do the firms
themselves.
In neither  Indonesia  nor Colombia  did  sample  firmns  report  benefiting  on any significant
scale  from  public  programs  to provide  direct  high-intensity  technical  assistance.  Indonesia's
Minisry of Industy has in place  a network  of technical  extension  services  which  in  principle
might  have  been  intended  to provvide  such  support,  but which  in practice  suppliedvirtually
nothiing  of benfit to thie  surveyed.  firmns.-The  only  Colombian  public  agency~  identified'as36
directly providing technical support on any significant  scale was SENA. However, as we have
seen, virtually all of this support was broad-based, complementary  to SENt's  primary mission
as a vocational training institute. (SENA presently is in the midst of a radical restructuring of
its training function, involving  a substantial shift to decentralized mechanisms of delivery.)
During earlier periods, Japan's technical centers indeed appear to have provided
substantial high-intensity  support. The Fukui technical center, for example, played an important
role between 1910 and 1930 in introducing the technology  for rayon production into the area.
And back in  -the 1700s  Tsubame's local government invited producers from Tokyo to teach nail
production to village manufacturers, an initiative which was the forerunner of the silverware
industry which dominates the area today. Presently, the role of these centers is predominantly
the broad-based one outlined above although, as the example  of handle 'Anovation  illustrated, in
a modest way all three technical centers continue to support the efforts of leading firms.
The case of Korea. By contrast with the other three countries, the Korean firms
reported reeiving  substantial  benefits from dh  country's network of state-owned  support
institutions. Table 15 summrze  the survey results on the utilization of collective  technical
support in Korea. Sixty-eight  percent  of the firms sampled  use at least  one type of collective
support, with the utilization rate ranging from a low of 26% for woven textiles, to 85  % and
90% for electronic and auto parts respectively, to a high of 93% among factory automnation
firms. The table distinguishes  among four types of collective  technical support. Provision of
technology information  can be viewed as "broad-based"  support, and joint and contract
technology development  as "high-intensity"  support, with technology assistance and training
falling in between. Collective support is most common for purposes of training, and least
common for joint contract technology development. Support for joint technology development
appears to be valued most highly. Unlike the patterns in Colombia and Indonesia, the finms
which use the Korean system tend to be disproportionately  large and export-oriented,
suggesting that Korea's collective  tecbnical support is rather more on the "high-intensity"  end
of the specum.  The larger role for high-intensity  support corresponds to-the higher proportion
in the Korean sample of activities  requirng  complex  gineing  tecnologies.TALEL&l  UTILIZtATION  OF  KOREA'SLEADING  SPECIALIST
TECHINOLOG  Y INSTITUTIONS  IN FOUR  SUBSECTORS  ___
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As Table  15 reveals,  a central  feature  of the Korean  technology  support  system  is its
institutional  pluralism.  Support  is provided  by six leading  parastatals,  plus subsector-specific
institudons.  For woven  textiles,  the leading  specialist  institution  is the Korea  Textile  Industries
Technology  Institute,  which  provides  a fill range  of broad-based  support,  and for factory
.automation  it is the Korean  Association  of Machinery  Industry,  one of the most  well-developed
trade associations  in Korea,  and for electonic parts it is the Korea  Electronics  Technology
Institute.
-By  contrast  with the pattem  for the other  three  countries,  no single  institution  reaches
more than  30%  of the firms  surveyed  (and  two  service  fewer  than 10%),  but viewed  as a single
system  with  multiple  components  the overall  coverage  is impressive.  Moreover,  the usefilness
scores  (as rated  by users)  are relatively  high for all institutions:  on a five-point  scale, none
averaged  below  3. Indeed,  the average  score  was 4 for the two  institutions  which  provided  the
most  intensive  support.
A.  firther coast  with  the other  counties is the predominant  role of cetalized
parastatals  in delivering  technical  support.  Even  so, there  is debate  within  Korea  as to whether
this  centralized  delivery  mechanism  remains  appropriate,  and  in recent  years  a number  of
industry-specific  technology  support  ishtutions have  been established.3Q/  Moreover,
comparative  empirical  research  on parastatal  behavior  has revealed  Korea  to be an outlier  in its
ability  to establish  and sustain  a relatively  efficient  parastatal  sector.  Further,  in none of the
other countries  studed  was the delivery  of technical  support  by centralized  parastatals.  anything
near as successful  as in Korea.  For countries  that  lack  an overall  record  of strong  performance
by parastatals,  an effort  to establish  a high-intensity  network  of collective  technical  support
along  Korean  lines  would  appear  to carry substantial  risks.
32/  The  present  parastatal-driven  support  infrastructure  resulted  in part because  of a
general  predisposition  towards  centralization  inKorean  society,  and in part because  all but
one of the parastatals  initially  were established  for other  purposes  and  only after  some  years
broadened their missions to include technical support for SMEs. Increasingly Korea is
experimentng  with more  dece  approaches  tD  providing  support,  with  KOTMTI  a
leading example.38
m.4:  Public Policy Towards the Acquisition  of Technological  Capability
As with export marketing, a central lesson of the comparative research is that private
mechanisms play the leading role in the efforts of firns to acquire technological  capability.
Consequently, the priority task for public policy is to ensure that the business  environment
facilitates  - rather than obstructs - the private-to-private  flow of information. Key measures
here might include:
* an openness to expatriate workers and technology transfer from abroad;
* investment  in human capital, including engineering  education; and
a spatial policy which nurtures the emergence of urban industrial districts.
Yet once a friendly business  enviromnent  is in place, the question remains as to
whether there might be pro-active interventions  at the micro level which can accelerate
technological  upgrading  by fms.  The comparative  analysis  of four countries  suggests  that
there are - that there exist identifiable  categories of firms, subsectors  and countries for which
the benefits derived from collective  technical support are substantial.
The analysis  uncovered two distinctive approaches  to collective  technological  support -
broad-based and high-intensity  support. The goal of broad-based  support is to contribute to an
information-rich environment, and its delivery mechanisms  characteristically  are decentralized,
with the role of central government limited to that of partil  financier. It can be a useful aid to
the technological efforts of firms of all levels of technological  complexity. By contrast, the goal
Of  high-intensity  support is to offer direct technical assistance  to firms, typically by parastatal
providers. Its role becomes increasingly  salient as industrl  development  begins to encompass
technologically  complex activities.
While it is possible that - if successfil - the retums from high-intensity  support can ber
very substantial, on all other counts the advantages  would appear to lie with broad-based
support. Costs are likely to be lower, since unike high-intensity  s  provision of broad-
based support does not reqlire erection of an elaborate physical and personnel infiastructure.
Being institutionally  less elaborate, the organizational  demands  of broad-based support are
fewer, and the risks of organizational  failure lower. And being decentalized in delivery,39
broad-based  providers are more likely to gauge accurately  what kinds of technical support finms
would indeed find useful.
In sum, the country  studies imply that 'broad-based" collective  technical  support may
be worth pursuing in many settings.  Countries  that already  have in place a well-function  system
of broad-based  collecdve support, and are moving  into technologically  more advanced  acdvities
could consider also the option of "high-intensity"  support, but in doing so should proceed with
caution.
IV: SOME COMMON  THEMES
We conclude by highlighting  three key themes  which cut across the analyses  of
technological  and marketing  support  systems.
First, the leading source of support comes from private channels  - from buyers and
traders, from similar firms, suppliers  and subcontracting  principals, and from the detenmined
efforts of SMEs themselves.  It follows that the first order of business  for SME support  policy is
to ensure that the private marketplace  can work, that liberal rules goveem  the in  ational flow
of technical  and marketing  resources.
Second, the benefits  of private support mechanisms  are not available equally to all, but
vary with an SME's "endowments":  whether SMEs are embedded  in pr-exidng  private inter-
firm or community-based  networks;  whether firms are pioneers in a new activity  or one of
many participants  in an already mature subsector, whether  the country in which they are active
has a high profile in the export  marketplace.  Collective  market  and technological  supports
tum out  -to be used and valued dispropzrtionately  by less well-endowed  - though subsequently
successful  - firms.
Third, the record of delivery of collective  thnial  and marketing  support is a
chequered one, but some promising  new approaches  appear  to be coming to the fore. The most
promising interventions  are those with a "light  touch": their delivery  mecbanisms  generaly are
decentralized;  and their goals are to support, rather tha  supplant, the private marketplace  - to
co-finance  SMB efforts to tap the maxketplace  for new marketing  and technical resources, to
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make  available  additional  sources  of technical  information,  and to facilitate  communication
between  firms,  including  between  SMEs  and international  buyers.
In all, the empirical  results  suggests  that, consistent  with  the emphasis  of the previous
decade,  the overali  business  and incentive  environment  is the most important  determinant  of the
effectiveness  of marketing  and technological  support  systems  for SMEs.  However,  the results
also  caution  against  complacency,  against  the presumption  that a liberalized  private  marketplace
will be sufficient  to secure industrial  development.References
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